Synergizing energy security and infrastructure integration: advancing the external dimension of European hydrogen strategy through trans-European networks

Written by Erardo Cerini

Erardo completed his Master of Arts in East Asian Studies (International Relations) at the University of Groningen in 2024. This paper was written for the Energy Security course.


Synergizing energy security and infrastructure integration: advancing the external dimension of European hydrogen strategy through trans-European networks

The case of the European Southern Neighbourhood

Keywords: TEN-T; TEN-E; hydrogen; diversity; relational autonomy; European Southern Neighbourhood

Introduction

In 2021, more than 40% of the gas consumed in Europe was imported from Russia (European Commission, 2022). The outbreak of the war in Ukraine resulted in the “[...] lack of reliability of Russian energy supplies” (European Commission, 2022b, p. 1) (emphasis added), thus prompting the development of the RePowerEU Plan in 2022 to phase out reliance on Russian imports (European Commission, 2022b).

Due to this historical context, I focus on the reliability dimension of energy security, which “implies the geopolitical dimension of energy security accentuated more in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 [...]” (Keypour, 2022, p. 55). Moreover, according to Keypour (2022), reliability, together with affordability, represent the two dimensions of the definition of energy security provided by the European Commission (2000), id est “[...] the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers [...]” (p. 1).

As an indicator of reliability, I use “diversity” (Keypour, 2022) which includes the diversification of sources (both in terms of fuels and technologies) and supply chains (Sovacool, 2013). These two criteria are suited to the research question:

How do the extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the projects of mutual interests of the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) advance the external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy? The case of the European Southern Neighbourhood.

Firstly, hydrogen import is part of the diversification strategy pursued by the EU to strengthen its energy security (European Commission, 2022a). Secondly, one of the criteria for the evaluation of hydrogen-related projects of mutual interest with third countries (such as those of the Southern Neighbourhood) is the contribution to supply diversification (Regulation (EU) 2022/869) [1]. Thirdly, diversity also concerns the infrastructure used (Sovacool, 2013) and, therefore, also those used to transport hydrogen. Indeed, Azzuni and Breyer (2018) point out that diversity also regards “[...] transportation, what routes are used (land or water), how many routes are used, and what methods are used (pipelines, LNG terminals, grid, ships, etc.) [...]” (p. 8).

The last aspect constitutes the reason for the relevance of this paper. Indeed, hydrogen can be transported in gaseous or liquid form, or combination with liquid or gaseous carriers, thus allowing a wide choice of transport modes, such as pipelines, shipping, trucks, and railways (ENTSOG et al., 2021). However, while pipelines are energy infrastructure (TEN-E) (Regulation (EU) 2022/869), land and sea transport (with related port facilities) are transport infrastructure (TEN-T) (Regulation (EU) 1315/2013). It is therefore relevant to investigate the synergies between these two networks.

The hypothesis is that the integration of the two variables contributes to hydrogen import from the Southern Neighbourhood (hereinafter, also referred to as “the Countries”), and thus, to the external dimension of the EU hydrogen strategy, as long as the relational component of the autonomy concept employed in this paper is satisfied [2]. The paper justifies the use of relational autonomy theory as it explains the European hydrogen strategy in its external dimension. Indeed, to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports, thus ensuring its energy security, the EU did not pursue self-sufficiency but developed cooperation based on interdependent energy interests with the Countries (European Commission, 2021d). This aligns with the key principle of relational autonomy, which states that acquiring autonomy involves the creation of new dependencies (Russell & Tokatlian, 2003).

To investigate the causal relationship, the research is broken down into sub-questions. Firstly, after clarifying the meaning of the TEN-T and TEN-E, an investigation will seek to understand what legal bases allow the former to be extended to third countries and the latter to be interconnected with them. Following the identification of the respective regulatory frameworks, an enquiry will seek to determine what are the existing energy interconnections between the EU and the Countries. Similarly, developments regarding the extension of the TEN-T in the Mediterranean are examined, with specific reference to the trans-Maghreb multimodal corridor. Subsequently, after an overview of the key features of the European hydrogen strategy, the discussion will seek to understand how existing and prospective energy and transport infrastructures can be used for hydrogen transportation. Once clarified how the TEN-T and TEN-E can individually contribute to hydrogen import, an exploration of the reasons why the two networks should be integrated will be done. Lastly, to verify that the causal relationship between the two independent variables and the hydrogen strategy in its external dimension works correctly, the operativity of the relational component of the concept of autonomy will be investigated.

Literature review

The literature analysed can be divided into three groups. The first group of articles (Ogden et al., 2018; Nikolaidis & Poullikkas, 2017; Khatiwada et al., 2022; Timmerberg & Kaltschmitt, 2019; Bhagwat & Olczak, 2020; AbouSeada & Hatem, 2022) emphasises the possibility of exploiting existing gas pipelines (id est energy infrastructure) between the EU and North Africa for hydrogen import. The second group (Lebrouhi et al., 2022; Mohamed & Ducruet, 2016) analyses also the dimension of non-energy infrastructure. The third group (Tanchum, 2021; Rizzi & Varvelli, 2023) discusses the potential for increased connectivity between Europe and the Countries and the benefits that such connectivity could bring, especially concerning European energy security and its hydrogen strategy. However, in all the articles analysed, lacking is an emphasis on the opportunity to integrate energy and non-energy infrastructure framed within the TEN-T and the TEN-E, to support the European hydrogen strategy; hence further and updated research is needed.

About the first group of articles, only AbouSeada and Hatem (2022), while performing an overview of the different ways to transport hydrogen from Europe to Africa, including in particular the exploitation of already existing and operating gas pipelines, emphasise the key role played by the TEN-E projects of common interest. However, the article is not updated to the new developments introduced by Regulation (EU) 2022/8693 [3].

Regarding the second group, Lebrouhi et al. (2022) emphasise the role of Moroccan port infrastructure in the exportation of green hydrogen to Europe. However, firstly, there is no reference to the TEN-E and the projects of mutual interests with third countries. Secondly, the authors do not take into consideration the role of port infrastructures in the TEN-T [4]. The latter aspect is considered by Mohamed-Chérif and Ducruet (2016) who analyse the MEDA, id est a European project aimed at integrating infrastructure networks (including the maritime component) in the Mediterranean area.

The missing element is still the importance of integration with energy networks. In addition, there is no express reference to the TEN-T.

Lastly, although Tanchum (2021) and Rizzi and Varvelli (2023) refer explicitly to the TEN-T, emphasising the potential of their integration within the trans-Mediterranean connectivity also in the light of hydrogen import, an analysis of the possibilities of integration with the TEN-E is once again missing.

In conclusion, the literature review shows that scholars mainly focused on either transport or energy infrastructures without considering the importance of their mutual integration to advance the external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy. Furthermore, and therein also lies the innovative character of this paper, the literature reviewed has limited itself to a technical analysis of the connectivity between the EU and the Countries without theoretically framing the new forms of cooperation that are being created. On the contrary, this paper employs an IR theory to theoretically frame the hydrogen strategy pursued by the EU in North Africa.

Theoretical framework

This paper applies the Latin American IR strand which developed a particular concept of autonomy (Dunne et al., 2021). This IR school is characterised by its hybridity since it integrates concepts from different IR traditions (Tickner & Wæver, 2009). The influence of classical realism emerges, for instance, from the focus on the theme of power, which is reformulated and reinterpreted in terms of autonomy (Tickner & Wæver, 2009). On the contrary, the influence of the liberal school emerges in the role of transnational actors, beneficial interdependence and market openness (Tickner & Wæver, 2009) [5].

This hybrid nature is reflected in the concept of relational autonomy used to explain the external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy. Russell and Tokatlian (2003) highlight that relational autonomy is strictly related to dependence since acquiring autonomy means creating dependencies with others. Indeed, “an increase in the autonomy level of our countries cannot [...] be the result of domestic or sub-regional policies of isolation, selfsufficiency [...]” (Colacrai, 2000, p. 207). The fact that autonomy does not imply self-sufficiency is reflected in the definition of energy security used in this paper, where the European Commission (2000) highlights that “[s]ecurity of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence” (p. 2). The European hydrogen strategy precisely aims to diversify energy sources thus reducing the risks associated with Russian dependence.

The realist component of relational autonomy emerges in the role of power relations in shaping individual autonomy. However, these power relations also constitute an opportunity to develop forms of cooperation with other countries which means creating other forms of dependencies that can fuel autonomy (Russell & Tokatlian, 2003). In the present analysis, the relation of power is on the side of Russia while the individual autonomy taken into consideration is that of the EU. To reduce European dependence on Russia, a “Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership” (European Commission, 2022a, p. 5) with the Countries was developed. This cooperation was portrayed as an example of a “win-win opportunit[y]” (European Commission, 2022a, p. 5), and was based on interdependent energy interests (European Commission, 2021d), thus constituting a form of interdependence (a liberal-derived concept) [6]. Another liberal component is the importance of non-state actors in IR (Russell & Tokatlian, 2003) which emerges in the active involvement of European companies in several hydrogen-related projects [7].

In conclusion, the choice of this theory is justified insofar as capable of explaining the external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy. The need to reduce energy dependence on Russian imports has not resulted in the pursuit of self-sufficiency, but rather in the configuration of new forms of dependence. The latter, however, are no longer oriented towards Russia, but towards other countries, such as the Southern Neighbourhood, Ukraine and Norway, from which a total import of 10 million tonnes of hydrogen is expected (European Commission, 2022a). Such conduct thus applies the tenet of relational autonomy according to which the acquisition of autonomy implies the creation of new forms of dependency (Russell & Tokatlian, 2003).

Methodology

This paper conducts comparative research using a single case study (Halperin & Heath, 2020), focusing on Southern Neighbourhood as a unified entity. The choice of this region derives from its criticality to test the hypothesis. Among the three main hydrogen import corridors, the Southern Mediterranean (involving the Countries) is identified as having the greatest potential for renewable hydrogen production (European Commission, 2022a); hence the fundamental importance of energy and transport infrastructure [8].

Concerning the time frame, the period 2006-2023 is covered, encompassing the initiation of the European MEDA project in 2006 (TRIMIS, 2006), which played a fundamental role in integrating infrastructure in the Mediterranean region. The choice of 2023 stems from the fact that it marks the conclusion of the consultations promoted by the European Commission for the TEN-E projects of mutual interest.

I apply an inductive qualitative methodology based on primary and secondary sources: European institutions’ official documents, academic articles, reports of think tanks and non-governmental/intergovernmental organisations, and documents provided by private entities. The necessity to focus on the last three types of sources (and therein lies the first limitation of this methodology) stems from the topicality of the inclusion of hydrogen among energy networks, such that, for example, the list of projects of mutual interest within the TEN-E will be published by the European Commission by 30 November 2023 at the latest (Yafimava, 2022). In the meantime, however, the projects proposed by the independent non-profit organisation Bellona Foundation (2023) in the context of the consultations initiated by the Commission were identified, hence the key role among the sources of this paper [9]. The novelty of the topic is also reflected in the content of some of the secondary sources used, which, given the current absence of both energy and transport infrastructure links between the EU and the Countries for hydrogen import, provide a prospective analysis of future trends.

The second limitation of the methodology concerns the investigation of the operativity of the relational component of the concept of autonomy. Due to word limitation, the inquiry will be based exclusively on the textual content of EU regulations and communications, specifically regarding the development of transport and energy networks. Therefore, this analysis needs to be complemented by an investigation that extends beyond the level of formal declarations to establish whether or not injustices or inequalities exist to the detriment of the declared “win-win opportunities” (European Commission, 2022a, p. 5) and, ultimately, the concept of relational autonomy.

Case study

As a precondition for the analysis, the need arises to provide a brief explanation of the meaning of the TEN-T and TEN-E. The aforementioned networks are regulated by Articles 170-172 TFEU and are conceived for the implementation of the European internal market and the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012) [10].

.According to Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 1315/2013, the TEN-T “comprises transport infrastructure and telematic applications as well as measures promoting the efficient management and use of such infrastructure [...] [consisting] of the infrastructure for railway transport, inland waterway transport, road transport, maritime transport, air transport and multimodal transport [...]”.

Regulation (EU) 2022/869, on the other hand, regulates the TEN-E, which includes energy infrastructure covering the following categories: electricity, smart gas grids, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and electrolyser facilities.

Having defined what is meant by the TEN-T and TEN-E, since the research question involves an analysis of infrastructure connectivity between the EU and the Countries, it is necessary to identify the legal basis for the extension/interconnection of the trans-European networks with the networks of third countries. Article 171(3) TFEU expressly provides for the possibility “to cooperate with third countries to promote projects of mutual interest and to ensure the interoperability of networks” (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012). Concerning the TEN-T, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 provides for the extension of this infrastructure to third countries. Regarding the TEN-E, Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 provides for the establishment of projects of mutual interest with third countries, thus interconnecting their energy networks with the European ones.

.After having answered the first sub-question concerning the legal basis for the extension or linking of the TEN-T and TEN-E respectively with the third countries’ networks, the existing interconnections between the EU and the Countries needs to be detected. Concerning the extension of the TEN-T, in the renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, the European Commission (2021d) reiterated the need to intensify efforts to adopt the indicative maps of the Trans- Mediterranean Transport Network (TMT-T) which “will constitute the external dimension of the [...] TEN-T” (p. 12)11. Although, formally, the TEN-T has not yet been extended to the Mediterranean region, important progress has been achieved concerning the trans-Maghreb network which is a key component of the future trans-Mediterranean networks (European Commission, 2012). This is also emphasised by the Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean (n.d.), which reports on its website the updated map of the trans-Maghreb multimodal corridor (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Trans-Maghreb multimodal corridor

Note. Adapted from Infrastructure transport networks and multimodal corridors in Western Mediterranean, by Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean, n.d. (https://www.cetmo.org/network-transport-infrastructure-western-mediterranean/ ). In the public domain.

Fundamental to the development of this corridor has been the MEDA project, specifically designed to extend the TEN-T through greater maritime integration between the Mediterranean countries and the EU (TRIMIS, 2006). Indeed, it should be recalled that the maritime dimension of the TEN-T is represented by the so-called motorways of the sea which encompass, inter alia, maritime connections between ports, the ports themselves and the related infrastructure (Regulation (EU) 1315/2013). Since the launch of the MEDA - Motorways of the Sea project, “short-sea shipping services to and from Maghreb ports” (Mohamed & Ducruet, 2016, p. 285) have been developed [12].

Regarding the interconnections between the TEN-E and the Countries, the fifth list of projects of common interest includes two electric submarine cables: the ELMED project between Sicily and Tunisia (to be completed by 2027) (Mediterranean Transmission System Operators, 2022) and the EUROASIA interconnection between Israel, Cyprus and Greece (European Commission, 2021a) [13]. Additionally, the projects of common interest also include gas pipelines (as exemplified by Figure 2) such as the Greenstream pipeline from Libya to Italy as well as “the Sonatrach pipeline network from Algeria and Spain through the Mediterranean Sea [...] and the Maghreb-Spain network” (Lenivova, 2022, p. 13).

Figure 2

Projects of common interest – gas pipelines

Note. Adapted from PCI Transparency platform. Projects of common interest – Interactive map, by Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency / Energy, 2023 (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/transparency_platform/map-viewer/main.html). In the public domain.

After having answered the second sub-question concerning what energy and transport connections exist between the EU and the Countries, we will now proceed to investigate how existing or forthcoming infrastructures (framed under the TEN-T and TEN-E) can be used for hydrogen import. Foremost, this requires a brief explanation of the European hydrogen strategy. The latter is developed to ensure the EU’s energy security in its reliability dimension, id est a constant and uninterrupted supply of energy products on the market (European Commission, 2000). To tackle the lack of reliability of Russian gas supplies following the outbreak of war in Ukraine (European Commission, 2022b), the EU pursued a strategy of diversification of both energy sources and supply chains [14].

Concerning the latter, the Commission aims to increase its gas imports from non-Russian suppliers; while regarding the former, it states the need to develop domestic production as well as to import hydrogen from non-European countries (European Commission, 2022a). The target of producing 20.6 million tonnes of hydrogen was set to replace approximately 27 billion cubic metres of imported Russian gas by 2030 (European Commission, 2022a). Of the 20.6 million tonnes of hydrogen, 10 million tonnes would be imported from outside Europe for which 40GW of electrolysers are planned to be installed in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods of the EU by 2030 (European Commission, 2020) [15]. The external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy consists precisely in the conclusion of “hydrogen partnerships with reliable partner countries [and] [...] envisages three major hydrogen import corridors from the North Sea region (Norway and UK), the Southern Mediterranean and Ukraine” (European Commission, 2022a, p. 5). In addition, regarding the import corridor from the Southern Neighbourhood, European energy interests are defined as “interdependent, complementary and converging” (European Commission, 2021d, p. 19) to those of the Countries.

From the aforementioned analysis, two relevant data emerge which can be explained within the theoretical framework adopted in this paper. The first datum is the EU’s initial situation of energy dependence on Russia and the second datum is represented by the situation of energy interdependence between the EU and the Countries. The analysis highlights the EU’s transition from energy dependence on Russia to energy interdependence with other countries as a means to achieve greater autonomy. Relational autonomy theory explains this shift by emphasizing the importance of dependence in fueling autonomy (Russell & Tokatlian, 2003). The liberal component of the Latin American IR stream aligns with the notion of interdependence and cooperative opportunities, while the realist component recognizes the power dynamics (Tickner & Wæver, 2009) in Russia-EU energy relations.

Having analysed the European hydrogen strategy in its external dimension, we will now examine how existing and future energy infrastructure (in the framework of TEN-E) can be used for hydrogen import. As previously mentioned, Regulation (EU) 2022/869 introduces the category of projects of mutual interest, id est infrastructure projects connecting European networks to those of third countries. Regarding hydrogen-related projects of mutual interest, Annex II of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 includes “pipelines for the transport, mainly at high pressure, of hydrogen, including repurposed natural gas infrastructure” (emphasis added) [16]. In addition, premise 59 of Regulation (EU) 2022/689 provides for a transitional period (ending on 31 December 2029) during which natural gas infrastructure may be used for the transport of hydrogen blended with natural gas or biomethane.

Consequently, two data emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the importance of existing pipelines for transporting natural gas emerges. Secondly, the Commission exploits all three existing modes of transporting hydrogen via pipelines: retrofitting [17], repurposing, and the construction of new infrastructure specifically for hydrogen transport. As a result, to import hydrogen into Europe, the existing pipelines for transporting natural gas from the Countries will play a crucial role (Bhagwat & Olczak, 2020; Hydrogen Council & McKinsey and Company, 2022; AbouSeada & Hatem, 2022; Timmerberg & Kaltschmitt, 2019) [18].

Although the list of projects of mutual interest within the TEN-E will be published by the European Commission by 30 November 2023 at the latest (Yafimava, 2022), in the meantime, the independent non-profit organisation Bellona Foundation released its proposals as part of the consultations launched by the European Commission. Regarding the Countries, the projects proposed by Bellona Foundation (2023) include the “HYD-N-642: HyPipe Bavaria - The Hydrogen Hub” (p. 4), whichenvisages the creation of a hydrogen import corridor from North Africa by repurposing existing natural gas pipelines. Furthermore, although it is unknown whether they have been proposed in the aforementioned consultations, Timmerberg and Kaltschmitt (2019) mention the “MedHySol (Mediterranean Hydrogen Solar) project” (p. 796) aimed at blending hydrogen in natural gas pipelines from Algeria [19]. Regarding the construction of hydrogen-specific new pipelines, Van Wijk and Wouters (2021) suggest that an infrastructure connecting Egypt with Italy could be realized. Once again, however, it is not known whether such a project has been proposed to the European Commission. In the absence of an official list of hydrogen-related projects of mutual interest, Van Wijk and Wouters (2021) propose a map with hydrogen import infrastructure outlook (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Hydrogen infrastructure outlook

Note. The preliminary design of a hydrogen infrastructure is illustrated by the orange lines. Adapted from “Hydrogen–the bridge between Africa and Europe”, by Van Wijk & Wouters, 2021, Shaping an inclusive energy transition, p. 100.

Having analysed how existing or prospective energy connections can be used for hydrogen import, it is necessary to analyse the role of the TEN-T extension for the same purpose, particularly the motorways of the sea. The extension of the motorways of the sea to the Countries is the focus of several projects, including the aforementioned MEDA project which facilitated maritime transport services to and from Maghreb ports (Mohamed & Ducruet, 2016). Ports are also important for the trade of hydrogen as it can also be shipped. This option is explicitly considered by AbouSeada and Hatem (2022) for the export of hydrogen to Europe from North African countries’ ports. Indeed, as Lenivova (2022) also points out: “[i]n the beginning phase, when H2 demand is not high, hydrogen transportation via maritime shipment could also take place and deliver limited volumes of H2 to European consumers” (p. 30). In this regard, it is relevant the letter of intent signed in January 2021 between Morocco and Germany for the export of hydrogen from the Moroccan port of Tanger Med to the German port of Hamburg (Tanchum, 2021) [20]. Similarly, Algeria intends to use also LNG ships for hydrogen export to the EU (Barnard, 2022) [21].

Moreover, the TEN-T also play a key role in its land part. In addition to being transported by cargo ships and pipelines, hydrogen can also be transported by truck or rail (ENTSOG et al., 2021). If North African ports are considered hydrogen-export ports, hydrogen still needs to be transported there from terminals. As exemplified by Figure 4, the transfer from terminals to ports can be done by pipeline, trucks and rail or by trucks (Borsboom-Hanson et al., 2022). Therefore, the previously mentioned trans-Maghreb multimodal corridor performs a key role in the hydrogen strategy.

Figure 4

Hydrogen transport modes from terminal to port

Note. Adapted from “Point-to-point transportation: The economics of hydrogen export”, by Borsboom-Hanson et al., 2022 International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 47(74), p. 31545.

Having answered the third sub-question regarding how the extension of the TEN-T and the projects of mutual interest of the TEN-E can individually contribute to hydrogen transport, the need arises to analyse the reasons why it is relevant to integrate the two networks to foster the European hydrogen strategy in its external dimension.

The first reason is theoretical and lies in the focus of this paper on reliability as a dimension of energy security. As aforementioned, to tackle the lack of reliability of Russian energy supplies, the Commission pursued a strategy of diversification of energy sources, developing the hydrogen strategy. However, diversity also concerns the method of transporting the energy source (Azzuni & Breyer, 2018). Consequently, in my opinion, to foster its energy security, the EU should not exclusively rely on the project of mutual interest of the TEN-E (pipelines) for importing hydrogen but also diversify the transport methods, thus also developing the TEN-T (motorways of the sea and ports with associated rail and road connections). Moreover, the same Annex IV paragraph 5 of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 expressly contemplates, among the evaluation criteria for hydrogen projects of mutual interest, “[...] the additional value of the project to the resilience, diversity and flexibility of hydrogen supply”. From this point of view, the use of alternative hydrogen transport routes (in addition to pipelines) ensures the flexibility and resilience of the system by reducing, for instance, the risk of possible interruptions in the supply of hydrogen via pipelines.

The second reason is pragmatic. As there is currently no energy infrastructure ready for the importation of hydrogen from the Countries, and given the urgency to tackle the lack of reliability of Russian energy supplies, it is crucial to develop also the extensions of the TEN-T, and specifically the maritime component for hydrogen transport [22]. In this regard, although the literature emphasises the non-economic viability of hydrogen transport by sea over short and medium distances (such as the distance between North Africa and the EU), it does envisage its use at least in an initial phase (Lenivova, 2022) [23].

The third reason is related to port-related infrastructure. Indeed, in the previous analysis of how the TEN-T extensions can be used to foster hydrogen importation, the key importance of North African ports was emphasised. In this regard, it was stressed that hydrogen needs to be transported from the terminals to the export ports and this carriage can be by pipeline or trucks and rail or by trucks (Borsboom-Hanson et al., 2022). However, while pipelines are energy infrastructure, railways and roads (for trucks) are transport infrastructure. Consequently, ports represent a clear example of the opportunity to integrate the TEN-E and TEN-T since they can play a key role in the supply chain of hydrogen, through the dense multimodal transport network (railways, roads and pipelines) serving them (Notteboom & Haralambides, 2023) [24].

Confirming the appropriateness of integrating the TEN-T with TEN-E is also the regulatory evidence represented by premise 36 of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 which provides that “during the planning of the various European networks, it should be possible to give preference to integrating transport, communication and energy networks”. Accordingly, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 (governing TEN-T) expressly provides for possible synergies with the TEN-E [25]. This aspect is also emphasised in the proposal to amend Regulation (EU) 1315/2013, where ports are expressly conceived as “energy hubs” (European Commission, 2021c, p. 22).

Having answered the fourth sub-question regarding the reasons why the energy and transport networks should be integrated, the operativity of the relational component of the concept of autonomy used in this paper needs to be investigated. Indeed, the causal link to be tested does not feature as a dependent variable the technical feasibility of importing hydrogen, but rather the European hydrogen strategy which is based on certain norms and principles.

According to Russell and Tokatlian (2003), “relational autonomy requires increasing interaction, negotiation, and active participation in the elaboration of international norms, and regulations that tend to facilitate global governance” (p. 16). Consequently, “the aim is not only to obtain functional benefits but also to develop a set of institutions and norms that incorporates the notion of “common good”” (p. 19). As far as the projects of mutual interest of the TEN-E are concerned, the aforementioned principles are reflected by premise 20 of the Regulation (EU) 2022/869 where it is highlighted that “[t]he Union should facilitate infrastructure projects linking the Union’s networks with third-country networks that are mutually beneficial [...]”. Engaging in mutually beneficial projects implies negotiation and interactions with the relevant countries which is a feature distinctive of relational autonomy. Secondly, according to the same premise, projects of mutual interest should “[...] demonstrate significant net socioeconomic benefits at Union level and at least one third country” (Regulation (EU) 2022/869). What emerges is a concern for achieving beneficial outcomes for multiple stakeholders thus reflecting the notion of common good characterizing relational autonomy. Thirdly, the theme of converging rules and institutions to foster governance emerges from Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 where it is provided that, among the general criteria of a project to be qualified as of mutual interest, there should be “[...] a high level of convergence of the policy framework of the third country or countries involved” [26].

As far as the extension of the TEN-T is concerned, premise 25 of the Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 highlights the importance of cooperating “with neighbouring and third countries [...] to ensure connection and interoperability between the respective infrastructure networks”. The interoperability target illustrates that common rules and regulations (applicable to different transport modes) need to be developed [27]. In addition, the idea of promoting shared benefits emerges from the fact that the extension of the TEN-T is considered “an enabler of trade facilitation and hence economic integration [...]” (European Commission, 2021b, p. 3).

Discussion and conclusion

The analysis confirms the hypothesis that the integration of the TEN-E mutual interest projects and the TEN-T extensions in the Countries advance the external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy while adhering to the relational component of the concept of autonomy. This integration is guided by principles of cooperation (including regulatory), economic integration and mutual benefit, reflected both in Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 and Regulation (EU) 2022/869 as well as in the Commission’s communications. Consequently, considering the limitations of the methodology, at least at the level of EU regulations and communications, the “win-win opportunities” (European Commission, 2022a, p. 5) in energy relations with the Countries are confirmed.

Secondly, the research revealsthat the EU’s initial plan to install 40 GW of electrolysers in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood by 2030 (European Commission, 2020), while importing 10 million tonnes of hydrogen by the same deadline (European Commission, 2022a) is unlikely to be feasible, especially given the lack of operational hydrogen transport infrastructure (Lenivova, 2022). On the contrary, according to Lenivova (2022), “starting from 2035, hydrogen imports could be initiated from the EU’s neighbours (North African countries and Ukraine)” (p. 35).

Thirdly, the analysis shows that through the synergetic development of the TEN-T and TEN-E, the EU can effectively ensure its energy security in the reliability dimension, whose one of the indicators is diversification (Keypour, 2022). In the present case study, diversification of energy sources was achieved through the development of the European hydrogen strategy. Moreover, the synergetic advancement of the TEN-E and TEN-T will also make it possible to diversify hydrogen transport methods, and thus, also of the routes used and the related supply chains.

In conclusion, this paper investigates how the extensions of the trans-European transport network and the projects of mutual interest of the trans-European network for energy advance the external dimension of the European hydrogen strategy, concerning the European Southern Neighbourhood. This research employs the Latin American IR theory, based on the idea that autonomy is fueled by dependencies (Russell & Tokatlian, 2003). The rationale for choosing this theory stems from the fact that it explains the EU hydrogen strategy’s external dimension. Rather than pursuing energy self- sufficiency by reducing reliance on Russian gas imports, the EU opted for cooperation based on interdependent energy interests with the Countries, thus creating a new form of dependency.

Although the findings endorse the integration of TEN-T and TEN-E to advance the European hydrogen strategy, a new appreciation is needed once the European Commission will have published the list of hydrogen-related projects of mutual interest and indicative maps of the Euro-Mediterranean transport network.

End notes:

  1. The Southern Neighbourhood is composed of the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia (European Commission, 2021d).

  2. As the external dimension of the hydrogen strategy is analysed, the independent variables are, on the one hand, the projects of mutual interest between the EU and third countries within the TEN-E and, on the other hand, the extensions of the TEN-T beyond European borders.

  3. Regulation (EU) 2022/869 introduces the qualification of projects of mutual interest with third countries and the energy infrastructure category of hydrogen.

  4. The TEN-T includes infrastructure such as maritime ports and their connections to other modes of transportation within the TEN-T (Regulation (EU)1315/2013).

  5. The combination of the concept of power relations and that of mutually beneficial relations allows the IR Latin American School to incorporate a realist understanding of energy supply as a security risk for predominantly energy-importing consumer countries (such as the EU) with neoliberal institutionalism which conceives energy as a field for mutually beneficial peaceful collaborations (Wilson, 2019).

  6. The limitation of the theoretical model adopted, however, lies in the fact that it overlooks the post-colonial literature that emphasises how the concept of interdependence and mutually beneficial partnerships are a way of hiding a “new scramble for Africa” (Hansen & Jonsson, 2018, p. 45).

  7. Among the various memoranda of understanding between the ministries of North African countries and European companies for the development of hydrogen-related projects are those signed between Egyptian ministries and Siemens, DEME (Belgium), and Scatec (Norway) (IRENA, 2023).

  8. The other two hydrogen import corridors are those from the North Sea region (Norway and the United Kingdom) and Ukraine (European Commission, 2022a).

  9. Consultations for projects of common interest and projects of mutual interest ended on 16 March 2023 (European Commission, 2022c).

  10. Trans-European networks include also trans-European telecommunications networks (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012).

  11. The adoption of the TMT-T (as an extension of the TEN-T) in the Southern Neighbourhood is also part of the European Commission (2021e)’s Global Gateway initiative, id est “an EU plan for major investment in infrastructure development around the world” (p. 1).

  12. By the end of 2010, a number of shipping lines were already operational, including, for example, Rades - Genoa and Rades - Marseilles line with regard to Tunisia or the Bejaia - Barcelona and Bejaia - Marseilles line concerning Algeria (Mohamed & Ducruet, 2016)

  13. The fifth list of projects of common interest was established according to the former Regulation (EU) 347/2013 which did not yet contemplate the specific category of projects of mutual interest (id est projects promoted in cooperation with third countries) provided for in the new Regulation (EU) 2022/869.

  14. This diversification strategy fully reflects the assertion made by Sovacool (2013) according to which one of the indicators of the reliability dimension of energy security is precisely that of diversification of both sources and supply chains. More specifically, according to Sovacool (2013), “[s]ource diversification requires utilizing a mix of different energy sources, fuels, types, and fuel cycles (i.e., relying not just on nuclear power or natural gas but also coal, oil, wind, biomass [...]” (p. 9).

  15. Of the 40 GW, 30 GW will be imported from “North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya) and 10 GW from Ukraine)” (Lenivova, 2022, p. 11).

  16. According to Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2022/869, repurposing means “the technical upgrading or modification of existing natural gas infrastructure in order to ensure that it is dedicated for the use of pure hydrogen”.

  17. Retrofitting “is an upgrade of existing infrastructure that allows the injection of certain amount of hydrogen into a natural gas stream up to a technically-sound threshold of H2/CH4 mixture (i.e. blending)” (ENTSOG, GIE, & Hydrogen Europe, 2021, p. 6).

  18. Overall, of the total 39700 km of hydrogen transport infrastructure planned to be in place by 2040, “69 per cent of the pipeline will be repurposed natural gas and the remaining 31 per cent will be new H2 specific pipelines” (Lenivova, 2022, p. 35).

  19. Also concerning Algeria, a partnership was launched in November 2021 between the Italian companies SNAM and ENI on natural gas pipelines between Algeria and Italy “in a move that demonstrates the viability of using existing infrastructure to transport hydrogen” (IRENA, 2023, p. 27).

  20. The letter of intent between Morocco and Germany can be explained also because “Morocco is considering shipping green hydrogen exports in conjunction with IRENA” (Barnard, 2022, p. 12).

  21. Namibia (not part of the Countries) is also planning to ship hydrogen to Europe since, in November 2021, an MoU with the Port of Rotterdam was signed “aiming at establishing a trading route for green hydrogen” (IRENA, 2022, p. 72). This MoU demonstrates that European ports are preparing for incoming flows of hydrogen transported by sea. Egersung (Norway), Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven (Germany), and Rotterdam (The Netherlands) are considered hydrogen-importing ports (Chen et al., 2023).

  22. The above-mentioned agreements between African and European port authorities demonstrate the role attributed to hydrogen transported by means of cargo ships.

  23. According to Lenivova (2022), “[m]aritime transportation of hydrogen cannot compete with a pipeline network, due to volumes of hydrogen to be shipped on the medium distance (up to 3700km for new H2 pipeline and <6000km for retrofitted natural gas pipelines [...]” (p. 36).

  24. Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 provides that member states “shall ensure that: (a) maritime ports are connected with railway lines or roads and, where possible, inland waterways of the comprehensive network, except where physical constraints prevent such connection [...]”.

  25. According to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 “The trans-European transport network shall be planned, developed and operated in a resource-efficient way, through: [...] (d) the taking into account of possible synergies with other networks, in particular trans-European energy or telecommunication networks [...]”.

  26. With specific reference to the Countries, the European Commission (2020) states that “[t]he energy dialogues with partners in the Southern Neighbourhood will help define and advance a common agenda and identify projects and joint activities” (p. 20). The EU-Egypt Renewable Hydrogen Partnership is also based on “[c]ooperation on policy and regulatory frameworks” (European Commission, 2022d).

  27. With specific reference to the extension of the TEN-T in the Mediterranean basin, the European Commission (2021d) maintains the need to “[...] seize the opportunities to link transport infrastructure through interoperability of rules and standards” (p. 11). Along the same line, it is stated need for “supporting regulatory convergence in all transport areas” (p. 12).


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Erardo Cerini

Erardo completed his Master of Arts in East Asian Studies (International Relations) at the University of Groningen in 2024. This paper was written for the Energy Security course.

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